Expectations and reputations in bargaining : an experimental study / BEBR No. 852 by Roth, Alvin E., 1951- & Schoumaker, Francoise

UNIVERSITY Of-
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGIM
BOOKSTACKS
HV^\ l^ ^ ^
m H
H
nfi
\
t «W i
/*..
CO
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/expectationsrepu852roth
1^. K2^
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 852
Expectations and Reputations in Baraaining:
An Experlmenta! Study
Alvin £. Roth
Francc'ise Schoumaker
2861 r.
a«w
3Hi JO xavaan 3Hr
Collece of Commerce and Biisi.iess Adm.nisiration
Bureau or Economic a.id Business Research
University of lliinoia. Urbana-Ghamoa.gn
iiiliiliJ'iliiii^^^^^
dol, IS
BEBR(L»f>
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 852
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
March 1982
Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining:
An Experimental Study
Alvin E. Roth, Professor
Departments of Business Administration and Economics
Francoise Schoumaker, Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
Acknowledgment: This work has been supported by NSF Grants
SES 79-15356 and SOC 78-09928. It is also a pleasure to
acknowledge the help of Michael Barr and David Sides in setting
up experimental procedures, and invaluable assistance from
our colleagues, Lawrence DeBrock and J. Keith Murnighan in
analyzing the data.
UBSA^-f S. eP 1. SSS^i' f'-'"«ifi"ifli/to..

Abstract
This paper studies the effect of bargainers' subjective beliefs on
the outcome of bargaining. In an experimental setting we show that
different mutually consistent expectations can be sustained: bargainers
who have different expectations obtain different payoff So This conclusion
permits us to provide an explanation for some earlier experimental
observations, and suggests some directions in which theoretical work is
needed
.
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1. Introduction
One of the tasks of an economic theory of bargaining is to specify
those factors which ultimately resolve the indeterminancy inherent in
bargaining. That is, even if we expect bargainers to reach an agree-
ment in the region of individually rational, Pareto optimal contracts—
which Edgeworth (1881) called the contract curve— it is still necessary
to analyze those factors which contribute to the selection of a specific
agreement.
The modem literature contains a number of different approaches
to this question. In the game-theoretic tradition, these models—both
axiomatic and strategic —rest upon the assumption that the outcome of
bargaining among rational, fully informed agents is determined by the
strategic possibilities available to the bargainers, and their preferences
as represented by their von Neumann-MDrgenstern utility functions. In-
deed, games in which the players have this information are called games
of complete information .
A longstanding obstacle to the empirical study of the descriptive
power of these models of bargaining has been that proper implementation
of the models requires the utility of the bargainers to be known for
each potential agreement. An experimental design which permits this
problem to be circumvented in a laboratory setting was introduced in Roth
and Malouf (1979). Starting with this first experiment, the outcomes of
bargaining under controlled conditions were observed to systematically
deviate from the predictions of theory. Subsequent experiments were
conducted to clarify and identify the nature and causes of these devia-
tions. Together, these experiments indicate that the outcome of bar-
gaining is decisively influenced by factors other than the strategic
-2-
possibilities and the preferences of the bargainers. The hypothesis
examined in this paper is that those missing factors concern the
subjective expectations of the bargainers about the behavior of their
opponents. By manipulating these expectations we will seek to investi-
gate the hypothesis that distinctj stable, self-fulfilling sets of
expectations are compatible with a given bargaining situation as deter-
mined by the preferences and strategic possibilities of the bargainers.
The organization of the remainder of this paper will be as follows.
Section 2 will review three experiments (Roth and Malouf, 1979; Roth,
Malouf and Murnighan, 1981; Roth and Murnighan, 1982) which isolate the
cause of the observed deviations from the predictions of classical
models, sufficiently so that a specific hypothesis can be proposed to
account for these deviations, in Section 3. A new experiment is then
proposed in Section 4, designed to test this hypothesis. Section 5
discusses the methods by which this experiment was implemented. Section
6 presents the results, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Review of Three Earlier Experiments
In order to test theories which depend on the von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utilities of the players, it is desirable to design experiments
which permit the utility functions of the participants to be determined.
A class of games which make this possible was introduced in Roth and
Malouf (1979).
In each game of that experiment, players bargained over the probability
that they would receive a certain monetary prize, possibly a different
prize for each player. Specifically, they bargained over how to distribute
"lottery tickets" that would determine the probability that each player
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would win his personal lottery (i.e., a player who received 40 percent
of the lottery tickets would have a 40 percent chance of winning his
monetary prize and a 60 percent chance of winning nothing) . The rules
of the game specified which distributions of lottery tickets were allow-
able. In the event that no agreement was reached in the allotted time,
each player received nothing. In other words, a player received his
prize only if an agreement was reached on splitting the lottery tickets
in an allowable way, and if he won the ensuing lottery. Otherwise he
received nothing. We will refer to games of this type, in which each
player has only two possible monetary payoffs, as binary lottery games .
To interpret the set of feasible outcomes of a binary lottery game
in terms of each player's utility function for money, recall that if we
consider each player's utility function to be normalized so that the
utility for receiving his prize is 1, and the utility for receiving
nothing is 0, then the player's utility for any lottery between two
alternatives is the probability of winning the lottery. That is, an
agreement which gives a player p percent of the lottery tickets gives
him a utility of p. Note that a change in the prizes is therefore
equivalent to a change in the scale of the players' utility functions.
The set of feasible utility payoffs available to the players in
such a game is equal to the set of allowable divisions of lottery
tickets. Thus binary lottery games can be used to experimentally test
theories of bargaining which depend on the set of feasible utility
payoffs. Note that the set of feasible utility payoffs does not depend
on the size of the prizes. Thus a binary lottery game in which the
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players know the allowable divisions of lottery tickets is a game of
complete information, regardless of whether each player also knows the
size of the other's prize.
Cooperative games of complete information are customarily modelled
by specifying the set of feasible utility payoffs attainable by each non-
empty subset of players for its members c Following Nash (1950), two-
player bargaining games are modelled by a pair (S,d)j where d is a
point in the plane, and S is a compact convex subset of the plane which
contains d and at least one point x such that x > d. The interpretation
is that S is the set of feasible expected utility payoffs to the players,
any one of which can be achieved if it is agreed to by both players. If
no such agreement is reached, then the disagreement point d is the result.
Thus in a binary lottery game normalized as above, the set S would be the
set of allowable divisions of lottery tickets, while d would be the
point (0,0).
Nash proposed that bargaining between rational players be modelled
by means of a function called a solution , which selects a feasible out-
come for every bargaining game. That is, if we denote the class of all
2
two-player bargaining games by B, a solution is a function f : B -* R
such that f (S,d) is an element of S. Thus a solution is a model of
bargaining which depends only on the information about the underlying
game which is contained in the model (S,d).
Nash went on to characterize a particular solution to the bargaining
problem, which along with a number of others has subsequently been the
object of considerable study (see Roth (1979) for a survey). However,
since a solution depends only on the pair (S,d), any solution is a model
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of bargaining which predicts that the outcome of a binary lottery game
should not depend on whether the players know the size of their opponent's
monetary prize.
The experiment reported in Roth and Malouf (1979) was designed to
test this hypothesis, among others. Participants played binary lottery
games under one of two information conditions: full information or par-
tial information . In the full information condition, each player was
informed of the value of his own potential prize and of his opponent's
potential prize. In the partial information condition, each player was
informed only of the value of his own prize.
The outcomes observed in the two information conditions exhibited
dramatic differences. The observed outcomes in the partial information
condition tended to be extremely close to an equal division of the
lottery tickets, while the outcomes observed in the full information
condition showed a pronounced shift in the direction of equal expected
monetary payoffs. That is, in the full information condition, in games
in which the bargainers had unequal prizes, the observed agreements tended
to give a higher probability of winning his prize to the player with the
smaller prize. Since the set of allowable lottery divisions, and hence
the set of feasible utility payoffs, is not affected by the information
condition, the observed difference between the two conditions suggests
that theories which depend only on the pair (S,d) are insufficiently
powerful to capture the complexity of this kind of bargaining.
Of course, there are other classical models of games which can
potentially be used to describe a game in greater detail. In particular,
the strategic (or normal) form of a game includes not only a description
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of the set of feasible utility payoffs, but also a description of the
strategy choices available to the players, by means of which the
feasible utility payoffs can be achieved. In the games described
above, the strategy choices concern the formulation of messages and
proposals in the course of the negotiations c Since the feasible
strategies available to the players depend on the information which they
possess, we must consider whether the observed results can be accounted
for by the different strategies available to the players in the two
information conditions. The experiment discussed next was designed to
address this question.
The experiment reported in Roth, Malouf , and Mumighan (1981)
involved binary lottery games whose prizes were stated in terms of an
intermediate commodity. Each bargainer was told that the prizes would
be expressed in "chips" having monetary value, and each player played
four games under one of three information conditions: high information ,
intermediate information , or low information . In each of the three
conditions, each player knew the number of chips in his potential prize
and their monetary value, but the information each player was given
about his opponent's prize varied with the information condition. In
the high information condition, each player was informed of both the
number of chips in his opponent's potential prize and their monetary
value. In the intermediate information condition, each player was
informed of the number of chips in his opponent's potential prize, but
not of their monetary value. In the low information condition, neither
player was informed of either the number of chips in his opponent's
potential prize, or of their value. In the latter two conditions.
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players were prevented from communicating the missing information about
the prizes. The games were counterbalanced in the sense that, in two
of the games, the player with the higher number of chips also had a
higher value per chip (and hence a higher value prize) , while in the
other two games, the player with the higher number of chips had a
lower value per chip and a lower value prize.
The experiment was designed to. take advantage of two kinds of
strategic equivalence relations. First, binary lottery games whose
prizes are expressed in both chips and money, played in the low infor-
2
mation condition of this experiment, are strategically equivalent to
binary lottery games with the same monetary prizes whose prizes are
expressed in money alone, played in the partial information condition
of the previous experiment. This follows from the fact that, under the
rules of the low and partial information conditions, any message which
is legal for one kind of game would be a legal message for the other,
and. so the strategy sets are the same for both kinds of games, as are
the utility functions and the underlying set of alternatives.
Second, games expressed in both chips and money, played under the
intermediate information condition of this experiment, are strategically
equivalent to games expressed in money alone played under the full infor-
mation condition of the previous experiments, so long as the monetary
values of the two prizes in each money game are in the same proportion
as the numbers of chips in the prizes in the corresponding chip game.
This follows from the fact that any legal message in one kind of game
can be transformed into a legal message in the other kind of game by
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substituting references to chips for references to money (or vice
versa) in any message concerning the value of the prizes.
Thus, if the observed difference between the partial and full
information conditions of the previous experiment was due to the
different strategy sets available to the players in the two conditions,
then a similar difference should be observed between the low and inter-
mediate information condition of this experiment. Specifically, the
prediction of the "strategic hypothesis" is that games played in the
low information condition will lead to agreements in which the players
receive approximately equal probabilities of winning their prizes, while
games played in the intermediate information condition will lead to
agreements in which the player with the smaller number of chips will
receive a significantly higher probability of winning his prize than
will his opponent.
Contrary to the expectations of the experimenters, the observed
results did not support the strategic hypothesis. The results observed
in the low and high information conditions essentially replicated those
observed in the partial and full information condition of the previous
experiment, but the outcomes observed in the intermediate information
condition did not differ significantly from those in the low information
condition. That is, in the intermediate information condition, the
observed agreements tended to give both players equal probabilities,
regardless of the size of their prize in chips. Thus, information
about the artificial commodity, chips, did not affect the outcomes in
the same way as did strategically equivalent information about money.
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Both of the above experiments thus revealed an effect of information
which cannot be explained by existing models. A third experiment, report-
ed in Roth and Murnighan (1982) , was conducted to separate this effect
into components which can be identified as resulting from the possession
of specific information by specific individuals, and to assess the extent
to which the observed behavior can be characterized as equilibrium be-
havior.
In the two earlier experiments, it either was the case that neither
bargainer knew his opponent's prize, or that both bargainers knew their
opponent's prize. The difference between the outcomes in the different
information conditions could be an effect which depends on (i) whether
the player with the higher prize knows both prizes; (ii) whether the
player with the lower prize knows both prizes; or (iii) an interaction
which occurs only when both players know both prizes. The third experi-
ment was designed to separate out these possible effects, as well as
those effects related to the fact that in the earlier experiments, it
was always "common knowledge" whether the bargainers knew one another's
prizes.
Information is common knowledge in a game if it is known to all of
the players, and if, in addition, every player knows that all the players
know, and that every player knows the others know that he knows, and so
forth. (The concept of common knowledge is formalized in Lewis (1969),
Auraann (1976), and Milgrom (1981).) In general, two bargainers can be
thought of as having common knowledge about an event if the event occurs
when both of them are present to see it, so that they also see each other
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seeing it, etc. In these experiments, a set of instructions provides
conmon knowledge to the bargainers if it contains the information that
both of them are receiving exactly the same instructions.
Each game of the third experiment was a binary lottery game in which
one player had a $20 prize and the other a $5 prize, and in which all
possible divisions of lottery tickets were allowed. In each of the
eight conditions of the experiment, each player knew at least his own
prize. The experiment used a 4 (information) x 2 (common knowledge)
factorial design. The information conditions were: (1) Neither knows
his opponent's prize; (2) the $20 player knows both prizes, but the $5
player knows only his own prize; (3) the $5 player knows both prizes,
but the $20 player knows only his own prize; and (4) Both players know
both prizes. The second factor made this information common knowledge
for half the bargaining pairs, and not common knowledge for the other half,
For instance, when the $20 player is the only one who knows both prizes,
then the (common) instructions to both players in the common knowledge
condition reveal that the $20 player will know both prizes and that the
$5 player will know only his own in the game about to be played. In
the non-common knowledge condition, the $20 player still knows both
prizes, and the $5 player still knows only his own prize, but each
player is told that his prize may or may not be known by his opponent.
After each bargaining session, players were assigned new opponents,
with the same information, common knowledge, and prize.
The results of this experiment permitted three principal conclusions.
First, the effect of information on what agreements are reached is pri-
marily a function of whether the player with the smaller monetary prize
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knows the prizes. Second, whether this information is common knowledge
influences the frequency with which disagreements occur, with more dis-
agreements occurring in the non-common knowledge conditions » Third, in
the non-common knowledge conditions, the relationship among the outcomes
showed virtually no departure from equilibrium behavior o The fact that
the information effect observed in the previous experiments can be ob-
served to be in equilibrium supports the contention that it cannot be
attributed simply to irrational behavior.
In summary, the results of these three experiments demonstrate that
information about the prizes in binary lottery games influences their
outcomes in a way which cannot be accounted for by the classical models
of games. The bargaining conducted in the first experiment reviewed
above met the assumptions of complete information in both information
conditions, since the players always had sufficient information to deter-
mine their opponent's expected utility. The results demonstrated that
additional information, irrelevant to the task of determining the players'
utility fuctions, nevertheless had a decisive effect on the outcome of
negotiations. The second experiment showed that this effect cannot be
accounted for entirely in terms of the fact that the available negotiation
strategies change as the information available to the players changes.
Instead, information about a familiar commodity (e.g., money) was shown
to have a different effect than information about an artificial commodity,
even though the two kinds of information made possible equivalent negotia-
tion strategies. The third experiment separated the effect into component
parts, and showed that the frequency of disagreement is sensitive to subtle
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changes involving what is common knowledge, and that the observed
effect is not a disequilibrium phenomena.
3. Subjective Beliefs in Bargaining
Taken together, these three experiments permit us to speculate fairly
specifically on the cause of the observed information effects. The first
experiment demonstrated an effect of information about the monetary prizes
which could not be accounted for in terms of the preferences of the
players over the set of consequences (lotteries) . The second experiment
showed that this effect could not be accounted for by the set of avail-
able actions (strategies) . The third experiment showed that the effect
is consistent with rational behavior. So, if we continue to hypothesize
that the players are (approximately) Bayesian utility maximizers, it must
be that the effect of information is due to a change in the players' sub-
jective beliefs. Thus, for example, information about the monetary prizes,
and whether this information is common knowledge, may influence the
players' subjective probabilities concerning what agreements are likely
to be acceptable to their opponents.
To see how the expectations of the bargainers might influence the
outcome of the game, consider the following "thought experiment". A
randomly selected individual plays some very large number of games in
which he bargains over how to divide a certain sum of money. Although
he doesn't know it, all of his opponents are confederates of the experi-
menter, and they all allow him to obtain, say, 80 percent of the avail-
able money. After he has gone through this experience, you have the
opportunity of bargaining with him on your own behalf (i.e., not as a
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confederate) . His past success is common knowledge. It will obviously
be difficult to bargain with him on an equal basis, since he expects (and
has every reason to expect) to receive 80 percent of the available money,
and since he expects (and has every reason to expect) that you will con-
cede it to himo Suppose that the rules of the game are that, after com-
pleting any negotiations, the players each separately write down their
demands. They receive their demands if they are compatible, and other-
wise receive nothing. Then, if this is the only time you will be bar-
gaining with him, the fact that this randomly selected individual now
expects to get 80 percent will make it very risky for you to write down
a demand of more than 20 percent.
In order to make more precise how such subjective expectations
enter into the decisions made by bargainers, consider a simple model
of bargaining in a two-stage binary lottery game. In the first stage,
each individual i makes a demand: i.e., he states the probability p.
(of winning his prize) which he wants and thus he offers 1-p. to his
opponent. In the second stage, each bargainer chooses between repeating
his demand or accepting his opponent's offer. An agreement occurs when-
ever the probabilities demanded do not add up to more than 1. No mes-
sages can be exchanged.
If in the first stage the two bargainers' demands add up to no more
than 1, an agreement is reached at which each bargainer i wins his prize
with probability p.. However, if the probabilities in the first stage add
up to more than 1, the outcome of the game will depend upon the players'
decisions in the second stage. Should each choose to repeat his demand,
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a disagreement will result and each will have a zero probability of win-
ning his prize. On the other hand if player i repeats his demand p, and
player j accepts his opponent's offer, there will be an agreement on i's
terms, that iss i will win his prize with probability p. and j will win
his prize with probability (1-p.). The final possibility is for both i
and j to accept the other's offer c In that case i will win his prize with
probability (1-p.) and j will win his prize with probability (l-p.)c
Having both stated their demands in the first stage, each bargainer
is faced in the second stage with the problem of deciding whether to
repeat his demand or to accept the other's offer. His expectations as
to his opponent's behavior obviously play a crucial role. The hypo-
thesis which the experiment described in the next section is designed
to test is that the expectations of the bargainers can be manipvilated
independently of the strategic possibilities and feasible outcomes of
the bargaining situation. This is at odds with the traditional view,
which is perhaps most explicitly stated by Harsanyi (1977) , who considers
two stage bargaining games of essentially this form.
Consider the problem facing the bargainers at the second stage of
the proposed two-stage binary lottery game, after players 1 and 2 have
made incompatible demands p. and p-, respectively. Let q, (i=l,2)
be the subjective probability of player i that his opponent (player j)
will repeat his demand p., rather than accepting p.. Then if player i
elects to repeat his own demand, he is faced with a compound lottery
whose utility is q.(0) + (l-q.)p.. However, if he elects to accept
his opponent's offer, he receives 1-p. for certain. So if player i is a
utility maximizer, he repeats his demand p. in the second stage whenever
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(l-q.)p. > 1-p
.
, and accepts his opponent's offer 1-p . when the
inequality is reversed.
Consider the maximum subjective probability q. for which player i
is prepared to risk a disagreement by repeating his own demand. Follow-
ing Harsanyi, we denote this maximum probability by r. and call it player
i's risk limit. It is easily verified that
P, + P, - 1
r . =
1 U.
Pi
(Note that, since p. and p. are incompatible, r.
_>_ 0, and r. <_ 1 since
p. ^1). If player i is a utility maximizer, then he repeats his demand
p. in the second stage if his subjective probability q. that his opponent
will do likewise is less than r., while if q. is greater than r., he
accepts his opponent's offer.
So far we have said nothing about how players might form their
subjective probabilities. However, implicitly in the classical models of
bargaining, and explicitly in Harsanyi's (1977) treatment (following
Zeuthen, 1930) of Nash's solution is the assumption that the subjective
probabilities q. and q. of rational players are determined from the
data of the game. Specifically, the assumption which leads to Nash's
4
solution as an equilibrium of the game is that if r. < r., then q. =
and q. = 1 so that only the player with the lower risk limit concedes.
This is an equilibrium at which the players' expectations are fulfilled:
i.e., the subjective probabilities by which the players estimate their
opponent's behavior turn out to be correct descriptions of that behavior. '
In contrast, the hypothesis which the experiment proposed next seeks
to explore is that the anomalous results observed in the previous experiments
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are due to changes in the subjective expectations of the players. We
propose to investigate whether the subjective probabilities q. of the
bargainers can be manipulated to produce different stable, fulfilled-
expectation equilibria.
4. The New Experiment
The agreements observed in the previous experiments tended to clus-
ter around two divisions of the lottery tickets: one kind of agreement
split the lottery tickets equally between the bargainers, the other kind
of agreement gave the bargainers equal expected monetary payoffs (this
bimodal behavior was most pronounced in Roth & Murnighan, 1982) . This
experiment investigates whether, by manipulating the expectations of
the bargainers, one or the other of these two kinds of agreements can
be obtained as a stable equilibrium.
In this experiment, each player played 25 identical two-stage
binary lottery games, of the kind discussed in the previous section.
Although players were told that they bargained with another individual
in each game, each individual in fact played against a programmed op-
ponent (the computer) in the first 15 games, as in the thought experiment.
Half of the participants had a prize of $40.00 and half a prize of $10.00;
players whose prize was $40,00 always bargained against players whose
prize was $10.00 (each player had the same prize in all of the 25 games).
The subjects were divided into three experimental conditions. The first
was a "20-80" condition in which the computer was programmed in a manner
described below, to promote a 20-80 division of the lottery tickets, which
yields equal expected monetary payoffs. The second was a "50-50" condi-
tion in which subjects bargained with a computer programmed (see below)
-17-
to promote the equal division of lottery tickets. The third condition
was the control: subjects never bargained with the computer but always
with other members of that group.
In trials 16 to 25, subjects in each group bargained with other
members of that group. Each game was played with a different, anonymous,
opponent. Bargainers also received some additional information, about
their opponent's "reputation" as established in trials 11 through 15.
They were told what their opponent's first demand was, whether he
repeated it or accepted his opponent's offer and finally which agreement,
if any, was reached in each of the trials 11 to 15, i.e., in the final
five games played against the computer. In trials 16 to 25, every bar-
gainers' experience against the programmed opponents was made common
knowledge in this way, as in the thought experiment. (Until the con-
clusion of trial 15, bargainers were not aware that their reputation,
as established in trials 11 through 15, would play any role in subse-
quent encounters.)
In what follows, we describe how the programmed opponents were
designed.
In the 20-80 condition, the agent whose prize was $40.00 bargained
with a computer programmed to do the following: it randomly selected a
first demand between 75 percent and 80 percent, and in the second stage it
always repeated its demand. The programmed opponent of the $10.00 player,
randomly selected a demand between 20 and 25 percent; in the second stage
it accepted any offer giving it at least 20 percent of the lottery tickets.
In the 50-50 condition, the programmed opponent of the $40.00 player
randomly selected a first demand between 70 and 75 percent of the lottery
tickets and in the second stage accepted any offer giving it at least
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50 percent. The $10.00 player bargained with a computer that randomly
selected a first demand between 45 and 50 percent of the lottery tickets
and in the second stage always repeated its demands
In summary in both the 20-80 condition and the 50-50 condition,
half of the bargainers observed that their opponents (they did not know
that they were bargaining with a computer) essentially always gave in
and the other half observed that their opponents never did.
As mentioned above, in the control condition, each $40.00 player
bargained with a $10.00 player from the beginning; bargainers never played
against the computer. At game 16, reputations were introduced and $40,00
players bargained with $10.00 players in every condition.
Note that two elements influence the expectations of a pair of bar-
gainers: their experiences and their reputations. Consider a typical
pair in the 20-80 condition, at trial 16. The $40.00 player has never
obtained from the computer an agreement in which he received more than
25 percent of the lottery tickets. He knows that his opponent is
aware of his reputation as established in games 11 to 15. So a
$10.00 player, whose own experience has led him to expect that his
opponent will capitulate to a demand for equal expected monetary pay-
offs, has his expectations reinforced when he confronts a $40.00 player
whose reputation indicates that he has, in the past, given in to such
demands. Similarly a $40.00 player, whose experience is that opponents
are adamant about an equal division of expected monetary payoffs, will
have his expectations confirmed by a reputation indicating that his
current opponent has previously behaved in this way.
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The experiment is designed to permit us to distingish between two
competing hypotheses. The classical game-theoretic hypothesis, which
states that the outcome of a game can be predicted from the set of feasible
utility payoffs and strategic possibilities, implies that, in this experiment,
the different experimental conditions should have no continuing effect.
Since the games in all three conditions are identical, the prediction
of the classical hypothesis is that, starting when the players are
matched against one another in trial 16, the three conditions should not
result in significantly different outcomes. Specifically, if this is
correct, we would expect to observe that, starting with trial 16, any
differences between the two experimental conditions and the control
condition would begin to disappear and the outcomes in the three
conditions should converge over time, as continued play removes any
transient effects due to the initial experience of players in the 20-80
and 50-50 conditions.
If, on the other hand, the expectations of the players have a critical
role in determining the outcome, as suggested indirectly by the earlier
experiments, then we should expect to see divergent outcomes, established
in the first 15 trials, persist in a stable fashion in each of the three
conditions.
Specifically, we would expect that the first condition's mean agreement
will be near 20-80 and the second condition's will be near 50-50. The con-
trol condition's mean agreement would be somewhere between these two. This
would be consistent with the hypothesis that the expectations of the
players were the uncontrolled factor that accounts for the results ob-
served in the previous experiments
.
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5. Method
Each participant was seated at a visually isolated terminal of a
computer-assisted instruction system developed at the University of
Illinois, called PLATO, whose features include advanced graphic displays
and interactive capability. The experiment was conducted in a room
containing over 70 terminals, 30 of which were occupied by participants
in the experiment, with the rest occupied by participants in other ex-
periments » Participants were seated by the experimenter in order of
their arrival at scattered terminals throughout the room, and for the
remainder of the experiment they received all of their instructions,
and conducted all communication, through the terminal. There were 10
participants in each of the three conditions, which were conducted simul-
taneously.
The subjects were drawn from undergraduate classes in the College
of Commerce of the University of Illinois. Pretests were run with the
same subject pool to make sure that the instructions to participants
were clear and easily understandable.
Background information including a brief review of probability
theory was presented first. The main tools of the bargaining were then
introduced. A demand p. was a number which was the sender's proba-
bility of winning his prize; 1-p, was the probability offered to
one's opponent. As in the previous experiments, probabilities were
presented in terms of the division of lottery tickets. PLATO computed
the expected monetary value of each demand and associated offer for both
bargainers. After being made aware of these computations, a bargainer
was given the option of cancelling his demand before its transmittal.
As soon as both demands were transmitted, the second stage of the
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bargaining would begin. PLATO computed the expected monetary value of
both demands for both bargainers. In the second stage, each player
had the choice of repeating his own demand or accepting his opponent's
offer. When both decisions were made, the bargainers were informed
of the outcome. Participants were told that they bargained with a
different individual in each game. In both stages, the bargainers were
not informed of their opponent's decision until their own decision had
been transmitted.
To verify their understanding of the basic notions, the subjects
were given some drills followed by a simulated bargaining session with
the computer. As soon as all the participants finished reading the
instructions the experiment began.
The bargainers in the 20-80 and 50-50 condition were paired with the
appropriate programmed opponent for the first 15 trials. The instruc-
tions of course led them to believe they were bargaining with other
individuals. The members of the control group were paired with other
members of the control group.
After completing trial 15, new instructions appeared on the screen
and introduced the notion of reputation. Note again that as a bargainer
was establishing his reputation, in trials 11 to 15, he did not know he
was doing so. Trial 16 began with each bargainer having displayed on his
screen both his own reputation and his opponent's. In trials 16 to 25,
in all three conditions, $40.00 players were paired with $10.00 players.
Since each group was composed of 10 individuals, the pairing was such
that each $40.00 player bargained twice with each $10.00 player.
After the 25th game was completed, the monetary payoffs were com- ,..
,
puted as described in the initial instructions: for each bargainer.
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one of games 1 to 25 was randomly selected; the lottery corresponding
to that game was then conducted with the specified prizes—$0 or $40.00
for the high-prize player; $0 or $10.00 for the low-prize player—and
the probabilities agreed upon in that randomly selected game. The
players were directed to the monitor who paid them.
6 o Results
Figure 1 shows the mean agreements, by trial, for each of the three
conditions for the $40 player. The figure makes clear that the agree-
ments reached in the three conditions are markedly different from one
another.
Preliminary analyses yielded no significant effects for trials for
the total set of bargaining outcomes and for the set that excluded dis-
agreements. Thus, the remaining analyses pooled over the 10 bargaining
sessions.
Analyses of variance for players (high prize vs. low prize) and
condition (20-80, 50-50, and control) were conducted for the outcomes
over all negotiations (including disagreements), for the outcomes
excluding disagreements, and for the first and second offers made by
the players. All of the findings were very similar: significant ef-
fects for condition and for the interaction between players and repu-
tation (F-ratio's in each case exceeded 16, with p < .001 in each case).
The means for the outcomes are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The results of
post hoc tests on the significant interactions are also shown in the
tables, indicating that, in each case, the outcomes of players in the
20-80 condition were significantly different from 50-50 's and control's
and that the agreements reached by the controls (with disagreements
-23-
Figure 1: Average percentage of lottery tickets obtained by the $40.00
player when an agreement was reached. Trials 16 to 25.
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Table 1
$40
Player
$10
Player
Mean Outcomes
All Negotiations Included (trials 16-25)
20-80
39.7
Control
34„6
50-50
22o4
c
30 o 2,be 40.8 b^
57.0
a
39.0,
D 41.1^
40.9
31ol
45.7
Note: Cells with common subscripts are not significantly different
from one another at the .05 level using the Newman-Keuels
procedure.
Table 2
^
Mean Agreements
Disagreements Excluded (trials 16-25)
20-80 Control
$40
Player
/
50-50
27.3
e
43.2^ 49.7
c
69.5
3L
55.7^ 50.2
c
$10
Player
Note: Cells with common subscripts are not significantly different
from one another at the .05 level using the Newman-Keuels
^|. procedure.
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excluded) were between those of the other two conditions. The compel-
ling nature of a 50-50 agreement in the 50-50 condition is highlighted
by the extremely low variance in the 50-50 condition (see Table 3j
which lists all of the final outcomes)
.
The offers made by the players showed a similar pattern, with the
players in the 20-80 condition demanding the most on the first round,
and conceding the most on the second. Generally, the offers reflected
the reputations established (see Table 4) : in the control condition,
most of the offers centered around 50-50.
There were 9 disagreements in each of the 50-50 and 80-20 conditions,
and 15 disagreements in the control condition. Although these frequencies
are not significantly different from one another (x (2) = 2.18), they
do suggest that the experimental conditions contributed to a reduction in
the number of disagreements and to an increase in efficiency of the bar-
gaining process.
7. Discussion
The results of this experiment provide strong support for the
hypothesis that the outcome of the bargaining is influenced not only by
the preferences and strategic options of the bargainers, but also by
their expectations. By manipulating the expectations of groups of
bargainers in this experiment, it proved possible to consistently produce
outcomes which differed significantly from those observed when the
players' expectations were not manipulated. Furthermore, the fact that
there was no significant difference over trials indicates that these
expectations were self-reinforcing, so that the outcomes which resulted
in the experimental conditions were stable and self-sustaining. Players
who expected their opponents to expect equal monetary payoffs (or an
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equal division of lottery tickets) continued to meet such opponents,
and to consequently reinforce those expectations.
These results also lend support to the hypothesis put forward in
the first paragraph of section 3 to explain the results of the previous
experiments. Of course, since those experiments involved no artificial
manipulation of the bargainers' expectations, it must be that the (common)
expectations which bargainers formed when different kinds of information
were available resulted in large measure from their previous experience.
This suggests that there must be many kinds of potential conflict in
which individuals have common expectations which permit them to effi-
ciently reach agreement. The benefits to a society of fostering such
common expectations are obvious, since otherwise many bargaining situa-
tions would end in disagreement.
The data from the present experiment suggest that individuals
entered the experiment with more or less mutually consistent prior ex-
pectations about what kinds of agreements would result, and that they
updated these expectations in response to their experience in the exper-
iment. These prior expectations, as reflected in the control condition,
yielded outcomes closer to 50-50 than to 20-80. It is perhaps for this
reason th'at the outcomes in the 50-50 condition showed so much smaller
variance than those in the 20-80 condition.
These results have several implications for the development of the
theory of bargaining. The most striking of these is that it may be
necessary to incorporate the expectations of the bargainers into any
description (or definition) of equilibrium outcomes, and that there may
in general be multiple equilibria supported by different sets of mutually
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consistent expectations. Some models consistent with this suggestion
have already been explored, and the notion that agents' beliefs play
g
a role in determining outcomes is not a new one. However, the results
of this experiment suggest that, because of the role which agents'
beliefs play in determining the outcome of bargaining, it may be nec-
essary to look to "culture-dependent" models, in which at least some
elements of the players expectations will be empirically determined
exogenous variables.
-28-
Table 3: Data
\l
Condition
Trial Control 50--50 20"-80
Outcome Player #
($40-$10)
Outcome Player #
($40-$10)
Outcome Player #
($40-$10)
16 44-52 1-6 0-0 1-10 20-80 1-10
45-55 3-8 50-50 3-2 50-50 3-2
0-0 5-10 0-0 5-4 0-0 5-4
0-0 7-2 50-50 7=6 25-75 7-6
42-58 9-4 49-51 9-8 0-0 9-8
17 47-53 1-10 50-50 1-8 22-62 1-2
50-50 3-2 53-47 3-10 35-50 3-4
45-50 5-4 0-0 5-2 30-70 5-6
40-60 7-6 50-50 7-4 25-60 7-8
40-60 9-8 45-51 9-6 20-80 9-10
18 50-50 1-2 50-50 1-6 - 20-79 1-8
45-55 3-4 0-0 3-8 0-0 3-10
0-0 5-6 50-50 5-10 30-70 5-2
40-60 7-8 50-50 7-2 50-50 7-4
37-63 9-10 48-52 9-4 25-70 9-6
19 45-53 1-4 0»0 1-4 20-80 1-6
50-50 3-6 50-50 3-6 0-0 3-8
0-0 5-8 50-50 5-8 12-88 5-10
35-65 7-10 50-50 7-10 21-79 7-2
46-50 9-2 49-51 9-2 25-70 9-4
20 41-59 1-4 50-50 1-10 22-65 1-4
50-50 3-6 50-50 3-2 25-50 3-6
35-65 5-8 50-50 5-4 25-70 5-8
0-0 7-10 50-50 7-6 21-79 7-10
46-50 9-2 0-0 9-8 20-80 9-2
21 34-66 1-10
'^
50-50 1-2 20-80 1-6
50-50 3-2 0-0 3-4 50-50 3-8
rx,
.
..... 0-0 5-4 50-50 5-6 0-0 5-10
45-50 7-6 50-50 7-8 50-50 7-2
35-65 9-8 49-51 9-10 32-65 9-4
22 50-50 1-2 50-50 1-6 0-0 1-10
45-55 3-4 50-50 3-8 11-89 3-2
. 1 0-0 5-6 50-50 5-10 33-66 5-4
0-0 7-8 50-50 7-2 0-0 7-6
34-66 9-10 49-51 9-4 25-65 9-8
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23
24
25
40-55 1-6 50-50 1-4 21-78 1-2
0-0 3-8 0-0 3-6 35-50 3-4
0-0 5-10 50-50 5-8 30-70 5-6
0-0 7-2 50-50 7-10 25-75 7-8
0-0 9-4 50-50 9-2 0-0 9-10
0-0 1-8 0-0 1-8 20-80 1-8
45-55 3-10 50-50 3-10 0-0 3-10
50-50 5-2 50-50 5-2 24-76 5-2
45-55 7-4 50-50 7-4 50-50 7-4
41-58 9-6 47-53 9-6 30-70 9-6
50-50 1-2 50-50 1-2 20-80 1-10
0-0 3-4 50-50 3-4 20-80 3-2
40-60 5-6 50-50 5-6 30-70 5-4
0-0 7-8 50-50 7-8 25-75 7-6
34-66 9-10 49-50 9-10 25-75 9-8
For each condition, for each trial, each line gives the outcomes for
the player (with the $40 player's outcome first) and the players'
number. Notice that odd numbered players are the $40 ones. For
example the first line in the control condition reads: ($40) player
1 bargained with ($10) player 6 and the outcome was 44% of the lottery
tickets for 1 and 52% of the lottery tickets for player 6»
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Table 4 : Reputation
(Odd numbered players had a $40 prize, even numbered players had a $10 prize)
Player # Trial Control
First Second Outcome First
Demand Demand
11 62 35 35
12 55 55 55
13 55 51 51
14 47 47
15 55 35 35
11 49 49 49
12 49 49 49
13 49 49 49
14 49 49 49
15 55 50 50
11 50 50 50
12 50 50
13 50 50 50
14 50 40 40
15 50 50 50
11 68 68 68
12 62 62 62
13 85 50 50
14 65 65
15 56 56 50
11 51 32 32
12 51 51
13 51 51
14 50 40 40
15 50 45 45
U 75 75
12 75 45 45
13 75 75
14 60 50 50
15 60 56 56
11 90 90
12 50 50 50
13 55 40 40
14 75 75
15 55 44 44
Condition
50-50 20-80
x Second Outcome First Second 0utc(
mand Demand Demand Demand
50 50 50 20 20 20
51 51 20 20 20
50 50 50 23 20 20
51 51 23 20 20
50 50 50 23 20 20
35 51 51 84 79 79
55 52 52 77 77 77
55 52 52 86 78 78
55 50 50 92 79 79
55 53 53 80 80 80
50 '50 50 70 21 21
55 55 80 24 24
50 50 50 100 20 20
51 51 50 25 25
50 50 50 65 21 21
55 51 51 80 79 79
55 51 51 65 65 65
80 52 52 100 75 75
80 80 100 78 78
80 52 52 100 79 79
55 55 29 29
50 50 50 70 70
72 27 27 40 40
60 « 29 29 35 35
50 50 50 46 20 20
54 53 53 82 82
53 53 80 80 80
52 52 52 80 80 80
65 52 52 80 80 80
59 52 52 80 SO 80
50 50 50 27 20 20
50 50 50 25 23 23
51 51 27 20 20
50 50 50 26 22 22
50 50 50 30 20 20
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11 65 65 51 51 51 85 78 78
12 60 60 51 51 51 80 74 74
13 60 60 60 49 49 49 90 78 78
14 60 60 60 50 50 50 80 80 80
15 65 65 65 51 51 80 79 79
11 45 45 52 52 30 20 20
12 44 38 38 47 28 28 35 20 20
13 43 43 49 49 49 35 24 24
14 50 50 50 49 49 49 55 20 20
15 44 40 40 49 49 49 33 20 20
11 65 65 65 54 53 53 82 82
12 70 70 54 52 52 80 80 80
13 76 76 52 52 52 80 80 80
14 66 66 53 53 53 81 81
15 69 50 50 54 51 51 80 80 80
.
<^
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FOOTNOTES
1, For a review of the literature on axiomatic models, see Roth (1979).
For some illuminating recent results using strategic models, see
Rubinstein (1982) and McLennan (1981)
.
2c When we say that two games are strategically equivalent, we essentially
mean that they can both be represented by the same game in strategic
formo Thus, any theory of games which depends only on the strategic
form of a game yields the same prediction for strategically equivalent
games. This is discussed at greater length in Roth, Malouf and
Mumighan (1981),
3. Utility maximization alone does not determine what action a player
takes in the case of equality.
4. See Harsanyi (1977) for a full treatment.
5. Consequently, reputation in this experiment serves only as an
indicator of a player's past bargaining experience (in periods
11-15). This is in contrast with some models in the literature
in which the players know in advance that they are building up a
reputation. For example, Rosenthal (1979), and Rosenthal and
Landau (1979) consider repeated games with complete information
in which players can strategically build and maintain reputations
in the course of play, in order to influence future encounters.
Kreps and Wilson (1981b), Milgrom and Roberts (1980), and Kreps,
Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1981) consider games of incomplete
information in which players may seek to play in early encounters
in such a way as to build a reputation which will mislead future
opponents about their true utility function. However, in the
games played in this experiment, the fact that players are not
aware that they are building a reputation in periods 11-15, and
that they cannot subsequently alter the reputation established
in those periods, removes any possibility that an incentive to
alter his reputation can influence a player's bargaining behavior.
6. There was a time limit of two minutes for the firs£ stage and one
minute for the second stage.
7. The experimental conditions can be interpreted as having changed
the strategic risk posture of the players, as measured by the cer-
tain payoff which they would regard as equivalent to the (risky)
opportunity to engage in the bargaining. The notion of strategic
risk posture (introduced in Roth (1977a, 1977b) and studied
in the context of bargaining games in Roth (1978, 1979)) plays a
role parallel to ordinary risk posture in determining an indi-
vidual's utility for engaging in a game.
8.
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An interesting paper in which a general definition of equilibriumm games is proposed which explicitly involves certain beliefs of
the players is Kreps and Wilson (1981a).
M/D/369
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